Ma seal script emblem馬依翔MA, I-HSIANG
國家安全INSIGHT / PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Rumors of a Political Reform Petition at Beijing Universities: Term Limits and Power Competition Ahead of the Fifth Plenum

國家安全# 時事點評# 中國政治# 北京高校# 政治改革# 任期限制# 中共二十屆五中全會# 權力交接

A political reform appeal said to have been put forward by students at Beijing universities is circulating online, calling for the restoration of presidential term limits and broader public discussion. This article examines the agenda of the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, term-limit rules, and personnel competition, while considering the possibilities of independent advocacy, subsequent political exploitation, and amplified dissemination. Evidence confirming the involvement of any p

Recently, a political reform appeal said to have been put forward by students at Peking University and other Chinese universities has circulated online. It calls for restoring term limits for the state president, promoting democratic constitutional amendments, and safeguarding space for public discussion. The materials currently available come mainly from media accounts and circulating texts; the identities of the initiators, the number of participating universities, and the scale of the signatories still require independent verification. The text drew attention during the Fifth Plenum, making leadership term limits, intra-party purges, and the transfer of power political issues worthy of closer analysis.

The Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Beijing from October 26 to 29, 2026. Its formal agenda included a work report by the Political Bureau to the Central Committee, the study of major issues related to comprehensively strengthening Party self-governance, and the review of relevant draft decisions. Before the meeting, official statements explicitly emphasized centralized and unified leadership by the Central Committee and improving the capacity for long-term governance. From this agenda, the meeting’s political functions can be understood in three dimensions: central control, organizational discipline, and the next round of power arrangements.

The first political task is to strengthen the implementation of central directives.

Comprehensively strengthening Party self-governance involves integrity, political loyalty, cadre conduct, and policy implementation. Through supervision, assessment, and disciplinary action, the center requires cadres at every level to turn political declarations into concrete action. This task addresses a governance challenge inherent in a highly centralized system: the top leader may control decision-making, but the workings of a vast bureaucracy are still affected by local interests, resource constraints, and individuals’ efforts to avoid risk.

The second political task is to restore order in the organization and personnel system.

Against the backdrop of successive investigations and disciplinary actions involving senior officials, the Plenum provides an opportunity to observe the confirmation of disciplinary measures, personnel vacancies, and arrangements for filling them. In political terms, these procedures affect whether current cadres remain in office, their chances of future promotion, and the continuity of various personal networks. Formal disciplinary procedures and the redistribution of power are closely connected here. Personnel outcomes remain subject to official announcements.

The third political task is to establish the conditions for discipline and personnel selection ahead of the 21st Party Congress in 2027.

This is an analytical assessment of the Plenum’s function. Assessments, disciplinary actions, and appointments before a Party Congress gradually define the pool of candidates for the next leadership team and communicate to cadres the standards for receiving preferment. This is why outside observers have linked the Plenum to arrangements for Xi Jinping’s next term; the specific arrangements still await confirmation through subsequent official information.

Placed alongside these three political tasks, the university petition makes the sensitivity of the term-limit demand clear. As the center uses disciplinary requirements to demand obedience from cadres, the circulating text directs scrutiny toward the highest level of power. As the center reorganizes the institutional order, the term-limit demand concerns the rules for succession at the top of the organization. And as the center establishes the political conditions for the next leadership team, calls to restore a limit on consecutive terms could alter expectations about long-term rule and the timing of succession.

Two distinct directions of supervision are at issue. Comprehensively strengthening Party self-governance focuses on top-down supervision by the Party Central Committee, using the disciplinary system to constrain cadres. The public participation and political reform addressed in the appeal bring public oversight of those in power into the discussion. Both can use terms such as anti-corruption, accountability, and governance, but they differ in the source of supervisory authority, who is subject to it, and the procedures for holding people accountable. What constraints the top leader accepts is at the heart of this institutional dispute.

The term-limit question also has a clear institutional background. China’s 2018 constitutional amendment removed the provision that the president and vice president of the state could serve no more than two consecutive terms, while retaining the provision that each term is the same length as that of the National People’s Congress. The CCP Constitution sets no two-term limit on reappointment as

Rumors of a Political Reform Petition at Beijing Universities: Term Limits and Power Competition Ahead of the Fifth Plenum

chairman of the Party Central Military Commission, and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China sets no two-term limit on reappointment as chairman of the state Central Military Commission. Therefore, if term-limit reform is to impose a comprehensive constraint on the highest level of power, the relevant rules would need to cover leadership positions in the Party, the state, and the military.

From the standpoint of intra-party interests, a leader’s continued tenure changes expectations about succession and may extend the influence of existing networks of close allies. Other cadres’ promotion opportunities, meanwhile, are constrained by age, the number of available posts, and personnel arrangements. Restoring term limits thus has both public-institutional and internal-interest implications. Some people may seek accountability for the exercise of power; others may hope to reopen the circulation of senior positions. In particular circumstances, the two motives can overlap.

Comprehensively strengthening Party self-governance may also increase competitive pressure among cadres. Disciplinary actions create vacancies; vacancies attract contenders; and investigations and assessments alter candidates’ political circumstances. In an interview with Voice of America, Shih Tsung-han noted that promotion competition may turn corruption allegations into tools for reporting on one another. This observation points to competition for power under a single leadership core: cadres can jointly declare their loyalty while competing with one another for posts, resources, and policy influence.

Internal power struggles should therefore be included in the framework for interpreting the petition. They could take the form of particular figures using the issue to apply pressure, selectively amplifying the term-limit dispute, or linking social demands to senior personnel matters. Each possibility has its own political logic, but evidence is still needed to establish specific operational connections. Current public information offers limited support for the claim that a particular faction led the petition.

Independent advocacy is the first pathway to examine. Students, young people, or intellectuals may put forward reform demands based on their ideas about institutions and then seek support online. This pathway would be supported by original publication records, independent responses from multiple campuses, and sustained expressions of support. The Fifth Plenum may also simply have been a moment the advocates themselves chose to speak out, since major political meetings can increase the visibility of related issues.

A second pathway is that other political actors subsequently exploit an independently initiated appeal. The initial proponents may be students, while those amplifying the message may have different personnel interests and political objectives. For these actors, the petition offers an opportunity to discuss term limits, succession, and constraints on the highest power. Initiation and dissemination may involve different groups; verification therefore requires separately tracing the text’s source, points of transmission, and contact records.

A third pathway is that particular actors use the name of universities to package political messaging, drawing on campuses’ symbolic status to attract attention. This hypothesis likewise requires support from author contacts, original records, and traces of coordination. Reposting by overseas media and social platforms may also make a text with a single source appear to be circulating widely. Each dissemination mechanism needs to be verified separately to identify the actual extent of political intervention.

The circulating text cites Sun Yat-sen and historical narratives used by the CCP itself, presenting its criticism through established political language. This approach can reduce the distance between the demands and official narratives and help people with differing positions understand them. Students and scholars with training in politics or law, as well as people within the system, might all use similar methods. Style alone has limited value in identifying the author; specific background still requires supporting source material.

Assessing the role of power struggles requires separating the initiators, disseminators, and beneficiaries. Political figures may benefit from an event even if other groups carried out the original advocacy; particular individuals may take part in reposting while their role remains limited to later amplification. Political interests offer leads for verification, but operational responsibility requires specific evidence. This distinction also helps preserve the agency and demands of the advocates themselves.

After the Fifth Plenum, attention should focus on the relationship between formal political signals and the petition’s dissemination. The replacement of Central Committee members, disciplinary actions, arrangements for leadership posts, and discussion of term limits can offer more concrete clues about changes in power. If these materials align with verifiable contact records, dissemination timelines, and sources, the hypothesis of internal orchestration would receive stronger support. Individual absences, a single deleted post, and changes in wording are better treated as matters to follow up and cross-check against other evidence.

This article’s assessment is that the Fifth Plenum strengthened the political functions of central control, organizational discipline, and preparation for the next round of power arrangements, creating conditions in which the term-limit petition could be politically exploited. Independent advocacy, the subsequent use of the issue to apply pressure, and amplification through dissemination may overlap at different stages. Existing information offers a comparatively solid basis for explaining the event’s context and the text’s significance, but identifying the involvement of any particular faction remains subject to verification.

The deepest tension in this event is that the CCP uses organizational discipline to reinforce long-term rule, while the term-limit demand brings the exit, succession, and public oversight of the highest power into discussion. Intra-party personnel competition concerns positions and resources; political reform concerns the rights people can actually exercise. In observing what happens next, it is necessary to examine both how power at the top is redistributed and whether society gains institutional space for sustained participation, criticism, and accountability.

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馬依翔 MA, I-HSIANG

Air Force Reserve Colonel · Korea Scholar · Public Affairs

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