On October 14, Japan’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning, two Type 055 destroyers, and one Type 052D destroyer were operating about 250 kilometers south of Ishigaki Island, where they conducted approximately 10 carrier aircraft takeoffs and landings. The following day, Japan further confirmed that the Liaoning carrier group was heading toward the Luzon Strait and the South China Sea.
At the same time, the United States and Japan conducted joint tactical training in the airspace northwest of Okinawa. The exercise involved Japanese F-15 fighters and an E-767 airborne early warning and control aircraft, along with U.S. F-22 stealth fighters. China also sent a Y-9 intelligence-gathering aircraft to operate in the surrounding airspace, prompting the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to scramble aircraft to monitor it.
These military activities took place in a similar time frame and area, and merit close attention from Taiwan.
First, the Liaoning’s route reflects China’s continued efforts to strengthen its naval operating capabilities inside and beyond the First Island Chain.
In the past, the Chinese navy’s main area of activity was concentrated in nearby waters. Today, aircraft carriers can pass around Japan’s southwestern islands into the Philippine Sea, then cross the Luzon Strait toward the South China Sea.
For Taiwan, this route has significant military implications.
If China seeks to impose a maritime blockade on Taiwan, it would have to consider not only control of the Taiwan Strait, but also the waters east of Taiwan, the Bashi Channel, and sea lanes leading to the western Pacific.
The Liaoning’s activity indicates that the PLA is continuing to familiarize itself with navigation conditions, fleet command, and aviation operations in these waters.
Second, an aircraft carrier’s ability to pass through the First Island Chain does not mean it is close to having a full-fledged capacity for joint operations in distant waters; there is still a considerable gap.
Japan observed about 10 carrier aircraft takeoffs and landings during this operation. That is enough to confirm that the Liaoning maintained aviation activity while underway, but not enough to demonstrate that it can sustain high-intensity carrier-based air operations over an extended period.
From a military professional’s perspective, I am more concerned with whether the Liaoning can establish a complete joint operations system with the PLA’s land-based air force, submarines, Rocket Force, coast guard, and maritime replenishment forces.
In particular, an aircraft carrier operating in distant waters requires sustained fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and intelligence support. These capabilities determine how long a carrier group can remain in a theater and whether it can exert sustained military pressure on Taiwan.
Third, the U.S.-Japan joint training reflects the continued importance of balancing forces in the region.
The joint training involving U.S. F-22s and Japanese F-15s and E-767s has significance for air superiority, airborne early warning and control, and interoperability in joint operations.
Through peacetime training, the United States and Japan maintain high-intensity air combat capabilities around the First Island Chain. This also requires China to factor the possibility of U.S. and Japanese intervention in a regional conflict into its military planning.
However, there is currently no evidence that this U.S.-Japan training directly confronted the Liaoning’s operation, and it cannot be taken as proof that China is conducting a blockade exercise against Taiwan.
Finally, I believe Taiwan’s defense preparations must move beyond assessing threats through the lens of a single military service or weapons platform, and toward an analysis of joint operational systems.
If the PLA imposes military control measures against Taiwan in the future, it may use the navy, air force, Rocket Force, coast guard, and other maritime forces simultaneously to constrain Taiwan’s air and maritime operating space from different directions.
We must continue to monitor military developments in the Miyako Strait, waters east of Taiwan, the Bashi Channel, and the Luzon Strait, and strengthen intelligence exchanges with the United States, Japan, and the Philippines.
The Liaoning’s voyage warrants vigilance, but it also reminds us that assessments of China’s military threat must be based on actual force deployments, logistical support, and joint operational capabilities.
We must understand what capabilities China is building in order to determine which aspects of Taiwan’s defense preparations should be strengthened first.