On November 10, Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed that the Chinese Communist Party’s Liaoning aircraft carrier group and fleets from other theater commands had recently conducted area-denial exercises in the Western Pacific.
The significance of this military activity is that China is pushing the area it seeks to control around Taiwan beyond the First Island Chain. Within this operational system, the Liaoning serves as a mobile aviation and air-defense node, while fleets from other theater commands, land-based aviation, missile forces, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems work together to establish an outer reinforcement-interdiction line, seeking to delay the approach of U.S., Japanese, and other allied forces to the Taiwan Strait.
My assessment is that China now has credible combat capability to establish a short-term maritime and air threat zone east of Taiwan, tie down external support, and disperse Taiwan’s defense resources. The capabilities not yet fully verified are primarily its ability to sustain a blockade for an extended period, generate high-tempo carrier-aircraft sorties, and continue fighting after facing countermeasures. These capability gaps affect the intensity and duration of a blockade; they do not change the fact that the threat has already taken shape.
Situation Overview
On November 10, 2026, Defense Minister Wellington Koo said in an interview at the Legislative Yuan that the Chinese Communist Party’s Liaoning carrier group and fleets from other theater commands had recently been conducting area-denial exercises in the Western Pacific. Taiwan’s armed forces had tracked the activity through joint ISR and were cooperating with allies on intelligence sharing.
“Area denial” uses aircraft carriers, surface ships, submarines, land-based missiles, long-range aviation, and ISR systems to prevent or delay an adversary’s forces from entering a particular theater. In the Taiwan Strait context, China’s main aim is to prevent U.S., Japanese, and other allied forces from approaching Taiwan from the southwestern Japanese islands, Guam, the Philippines, and the Western Pacific.
China has not publicly disclosed the full force composition, routes, timing, or live-fire details of this round of exercises. Monitoring information released by Japan’s Ministry of Defense for October 13–15 is the latest publicly verifiable set of information on the Liaoning’s core group.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force confirmed at the time that the Liaoning and three missile destroyers passed through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island into the Western Pacific. They conducted about 10 takeoffs and landings of carrier-based fighter jets and helicopters around 250 kilometers south of Ishigaki Island, then turned toward the South China Sea via the area southeast of Taiwan.
Date of activity: Recent; the latest publicly verifiable Liaoning transit and carrier-aircraft activity took place from October 13 to 15, 2026.
Date of announcement: The Ministry of National Defense publicly confirmed the area-denial exercises on November 10, 2026.
Publicly Confirmed Composition of the Liaoning Carrier Group
The latest Liaoning core group that can be confirmed from Japan’s Ministry of Defense information comprises four warships: the Liaoning aircraft carrier, the Type 055 large missile destroyers Anshan and Wuxi, and the Type 052D missile destroyer Huainan.
The Liaoning, hull number 16, is the carrier group’s core aviation asset. It can carry J-15 carrier-based fighters, as well as early-warning, anti-submarine, transport, and search-and-rescue helicopters. Its main missions include combat air patrol, fleet air defense, anti-surface warfare, reconnaissance, and maritime air traffic control.
Anshan, hull number 103, and Wuxi, hull number 104, are both Type 055 large missile destroyers. The Type 055 is equipped with 112 vertical launch cells and has area air-defense, long-range anti-ship, land-attack, anti-submarine, and fleet-command capabilities. The presence of two Type 055s in the group can increase its missile capacity, extend the carrier’s outer air-defense perimeter, and distribute the burden of countering air and surface threats from multiple directions.
Huainan, hull number 123, is a Type 052D missile destroyer. Its main roles are fleet air defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare, and close escort. The Type 052D can reinforce the layered protection between the carrier and the larger Type 055 destroyers, providing additional sensor and fire support if the group encounters threats in the air, on the surface, or underwater.
Publicly available information currently confirms only these four core warships. For a carrier group to operate in the Western Pacific for an extended period, it would also need support from replenishment ships carrying fuel and ammunition, submarines, intelligence-gathering ships, maritime patrol aircraft, airborne early-warning aircraft, and satellite systems.
In late October, a Type 055 destroyer, a Type 052D destroyer, a Type 054A frigate, a Type 903 replenishment ship, and China Coast Guard vessels also transited the Miyako and Ōsumi straits at different times. These vessels can be viewed as part of China’s broader force deployment, but there is currently no public evidence that they were all under unified command with the Liaoning. They are therefore not included in the Liaoning’s core escort group.
The Liaoning core group publicly confirmed by Japan’s Ministry of Defense from October 13 to 15, 2026, comprised the Liaoning aircraft carrier, the Type 055 large missile destroyers Anshan and Wuxi, and the Type 052D missile destroyer Huainan. The actual duties of each ship within the group have not been disclosed by China. The roles shown in the graphic are assessments based on the main functions of each ship class.
Key Questions
This round of exercises raises three key questions.
First, has China turned routine long-distance training into a live-force test of blockade and reinforcement-interdiction operations in the Taiwan Strait?
Second, can the Liaoning share target information in real time with fleets from other theater commands, land-based missile forces, air force early-warning aircraft, bombers, drones, and satellite systems to create a cross-service joint fire chain?
Third, can China sustain carrier aviation, maritime air defense, and logistical support east of Taiwan and in the Western Pacific, thereby disrupting the approach of U.S. and Japanese forces to the Taiwan Strait?
These three questions concern operational intent, the maturity of joint operations, and the ability to sustain combat operations. They are also key to assessing whether China has acquired a complete blockade capability.
Exercises Confirmed in Public Sources
Activities that can currently be confirmed from public sources include a carrier group crossing the First Island Chain, long-range formation operations, takeoffs and landings by carrier-based fighter jets and helicopters, and multiple surface fleets separately entering and leaving the Western Pacific.
China says the Liaoning is conducting its annual routine training, intended to test the forces’ readiness and long-distance mission capabilities.
Previously announced Liaoning long-range exercise activities have included long-range tactical flights, live-fire exercises, support and cover, comprehensive search and rescue, reconnaissance and early warning, maritime assault, fleet air defense, counterattacks, and day-and-night carrier-aircraft operations. These activities can serve as a reference for assessing the direction of the current training, but more public evidence is needed to confirm whether each was conducted in this round.
Operational Mechanisms China Is Testing
The first purpose of this round of exercises is to test a carrier group’s ability to cross the First Island Chain.
The Liaoning group can enter the Western Pacific through the Miyako or Bashi Strait and deploy east of Taiwan. This route can test the group’s procedures for vigilance, escort, anti-submarine warfare, and air defense while passing through narrow waterways. It can also measure the surveillance and reconnaissance responses of Japan, the United States, and Taiwan.
The second purpose is to establish mobile air cover east of Taiwan.
The Liaoning can send J-15 carrier-based fighters on air patrols, extending the Chinese navy’s air-protection range beyond the First Island Chain. The J-15 can also conduct anti-ship attacks and escort the fleet, increasing the risks to Taiwan’s armed forces and allied forces as they approach the carrier group.
The third purpose is to establish layered fleet air defense.
Two Type 055 large missile destroyers and one Type 052D missile destroyer can jointly establish long-, medium-, and short-range air-defense layers to protect the Liaoning and other surface ships. The high proportion of destroyers in this formation indicates that China places importance on air defense and long-range firepower around the carrier.
The fourth purpose is to search for and tie down external support forces.
China can use carrier-based aircraft, destroyer radars, satellites, drones, and land-based early-warning aircraft to search for U.S. and Japanese forces approaching from Guam, the southwestern Japanese islands, and the Philippines, then pass target information to surface ships, bombers, submarines, or land-based missile forces.
The fifth purpose is to support a blockade around Taiwan.
While other Chinese fleets impose a blockade to the west, north, and south of Taiwan, the Liaoning group can establish an outer surveillance and reinforcement-interdiction line east of Taiwan, forcing Taiwan’s armed forces to face pressure on the western front as well as threats in the eastern waters.
Why Choose Taiwan’s East and the Western Pacific?
Western Taiwan is closer to China’s mainland air bases, missile positions, and naval and air bases. Eastern Taiwan, meanwhile, plays an important role in preserving combat capability, replenishing reserves, and receiving allied support.
The military bases in Hualien and Taitung, Suao Port, the Bashi Strait, and the Miyako Strait together connect Taiwan proper with Japan’s southwestern islands, northern Philippines, and Western Pacific sea lanes.
Sending the Liaoning forward to the east of Taiwan can achieve three strategic effects.
First, it forces Taiwan’s armed forces to disperse air-defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and ISR resources across both the eastern and western sides.
Second, it brings Hualien and Taitung bases, Suao Port, eastern air and maritime routes, and areas for preserving combat capability within the threat zone.
Third, it raises the cost of U.S. and Japanese forces approaching the Taiwan Strait from Guam, Japan, or the Philippines.
China is turning eastern Taiwan from a space for preserving combat capability into a frontline operational area, and integrating “blockading Taiwan” and “preventing allied reinforcements” into the same operational plan.
Assessment of the Balance of Forces in the Taiwan Strait
The Liaoning’s main value is that it gives China a mobile aviation, air-defense, and command node.
The two Type 055 large missile destroyers increase the group’s missile capacity, area air-defense capability, and long-range anti-ship firepower. The Type 052D destroyer is responsible for layered air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and close escort. When this group is integrated with fleets from other theater commands, land-based missiles, long-range aviation, and ISR systems, China can establish a temporary zone of maritime and air superiority east of Taiwan.
The Liaoning still uses a ski-jump flight deck, requiring J-15s to trade off between fuel and weapons payload when taking off. It also lacks a fixed-wing airborne early-warning aircraft launched by catapult, so its awareness of air activity at long range still depends on early-warning helicopters, land-based airborne early-warning aircraft, satellites, and other platforms.
These conditions limit the Liaoning’s ability to sustain high-tempo carrier-aircraft operations for an extended period, but do not eliminate its ability to provide short-term air cover east of Taiwan, protect surface fleets, and tie down external support.
Overall, China has a credible capability to impose a short-term maritime and air blockade, provide fleet air defense, and tie down external support east of Taiwan. It is also increasing coordination among fleets from different theater commands.
The overall threat should be assessed as “credible, steadily increasing, and not yet fully mature.” Taiwan cannot wait until China completes its blockade system before beginning to build countermeasures.
Taiwan’s Response Priorities
Taiwan’s armed forces should incorporate eastern Taiwan, the Miyako Strait, the Bashi Strait, and the Western Pacific into a single joint operational picture, integrating satellites, drones, maritime and air radars, underwater surveillance, and allied intelligence.
Eastern bases should accelerate efforts to strengthen dispersal, aircraft shelter protection, runway repair, mobile air defense, decoys, underground facilities, and backup command capabilities, reducing the impact of carrier aviation and long-range missiles on Taiwan’s combat capability.
Taiwan’s armed forces should also establish a complete kill chain targeting carrier groups, prioritizing the tracking of their ISR platforms, replenishment ships, escort ships, and carrier aviation so China cannot maintain a maritime and air-defense network for an extended period.
The Han Kuang exercises should add compound scenarios in which “the west faces the main attack, the east is tied down by a carrier, and the Bashi and Miyako straits are blocked simultaneously.” These should practically test whether Taiwan’s armed forces can preserve combat capability under threats from multiple directions, keep ports and airports operating, and receive external support.
Taiwan also needs to establish more timely maritime and air situation-sharing mechanisms with the United States, Japan, and the Philippines to track changes in the composition of Chinese fleets after they cross the First Island Chain, carrier-aircraft activity, and maritime replenishment.
What to Watch Next
Going forward, it is important to monitor whether replenishment ships, submarines, or intelligence ships join the Liaoning group; whether daily and nighttime carrier-aircraft sortie numbers increase; and whether KJ-500 aircraft, Y-20 tankers, H-6 bombers, drones, and the Liaoning begin operating in coordination.
Other important indicators include live-fire anti-ship, air-defense, and anti-submarine exercises; cross-service target handoffs; continuous rotation east of Taiwan across multiple days; changes to civilian air and commercial shipping routes; and whether multiple theater fleets can carry out blockade and reinforcement-interdiction missions simultaneously under unified command.
The capability China is seeking to build is the ability to push its blockade line around Taiwan into the Western Pacific, cut off or delay allied reinforcements, and force Taiwan’s armed forces to defend both the western front and the eastern waters at the same time.
Eastern Taiwan has already become an inseparable part of the front line of Taiwan Strait defense.
References
Military News Agency, Ministry of National Defense, “China conducts exercises in the Western Pacific; Minister Koo: Armed forces are closely monitoring and responding,” November 10, 2026.
https://mna.mnd.gov.tw/news/detail/?UserKey=8f997380-c276-44c7-bab0-55b52ff7e178
Japan Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff, “Movements of Chinese naval vessels: Liaoning and three other vessels enter the Pacific,” October 14, 2026.
https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2026/p20261014_01.pdf
Japan Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff, “Liaoning carrier aircraft take off and land; group turns toward the South China Sea,” October 15, 2026.
https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2026/p20261015_02.pdf
Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Liaoning carrier group conducts training in relevant waters of the Western Pacific,” October 14, 2026.
https://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16492998.html
Japan Ministry of Defense, 2026 Defense of Japan White Paper, China’s military section.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/html/n130202000.html
Reuters, “Taiwan says China is conducting ‘area denial’ drills in Western Pacific,” November 10, 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-china-is-conducting-area-denial-drills-western-pacific-2026-11-10/