Ma seal script emblem馬依翔MA, I-HSIANG
國家安全INSIGHT / PUBLIC AFFAIRS

From Multi-Axis Pressure Around Taiwan to a First Island Chain War of Attrition: Beijing Is Building a Low-Warning Blockade Posture

國家安全# 第一島鏈# 中共軍事活動# 軍事封控# 國防預警

The PLA’s multi-axis activity around Taiwan, an unnamed large-scale force buildup, and rising emergency scrambles in Japan’s southwestern airspace point to interconnected blockade preparations. This article examines the implications for Taiwan’s warning time, First Island Chain security, and coordination among Taiwan and its partners.

Key Assessment
PLA multi-axis air and maritime activity around Taiwan, an unnamed large-scale force buildup, and an increase in emergency scrambles in Japan’s southwestern airspace should be viewed together as three elements of the same strategic trend.

Beijing is building a low-warning blockade posture that can operate in peacetime and shift rapidly to wartime: military aircraft, warships, and government vessels continuously constrain Taiwan on the inner layer; aircraft carriers, destroyers, and replenishment ships operate inside and beyond the First Island Chain on the outer layer, preparing to block outside assistance; meanwhile, high-frequency activity wears down Taiwan’s and Japan’s surveillance, interception, and readiness resources.

There is currently no public evidence proving that all three activities are under a single operational command. However, their force deployments, areas of activity, and strategic effects are highly consistent. Beijing’s objectives are already clear: compress Taiwan’s warning time, establish an encirclement posture, raise the cost of U.S. and Japanese intervention, and gradually fold large-scale military buildups into routine activity.
I. Situation Overview
On November 13, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that between 06:00 on November 12 and 06:00 on November 13, the armed forces detected 30 sorties by PLA aircraft, eight PLA vessels, and three Chinese government vessels operating around the Taiwan Strait. Of the aircraft sorties, 23 crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait or entered Taiwan’s northern, central, southwestern, and eastern air defense identification zones. The armed forces deployed mission aircraft, warships, and land-based missile systems to monitor and respond.

This tally covers part of the period of the PLA’s joint combat readiness patrol on the morning of November 12, so the 29 sorties reported the previous day should not be added directly to the 30 in this report. What is notable is that PLA forces appeared simultaneously to the north, center, southwest, and east of Taiwan, accompanied by naval and government vessels, creating sustained pressure across multiple regions and services.

Reuters reported further on November 13 that Taiwanese security officials assessed that Beijing had conducted an unannounced, unnamed large-scale activity around Taiwan and in the western Pacific in early November. More than 100 naval and coast guard vessels may have participated at its peak, with around 70 still inside the First Island Chain as of November 13. The officials also said that the activity involved the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Theater Commands and included blockade and attack scenarios. The reported scale and scenarios are based mainly on anonymous officials and require further verification through public information.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that at around 16:00 on November 12, the Type 052D guided-missile destroyer No. 121 and the Type 901 comprehensive replenishment ship sailed south through waters west of Kume Island, passed through the waterway between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island, and entered the western Pacific. The Type 052D destroyer provides area air defense, anti-ship capabilities, and escort for a formation; the Type 901 replenishment ship can provide fuel, ammunition, and supplies, helping a fleet remain at sea for extended periods.

On the same day, Japan’s Ministry of Defense released emergency scramble statistics for October 2026. The Air Self-Defense Force conducted 135 emergency scrambles that month, 94 in response to Chinese aircraft, with 73 in southwestern airspace. Compared with September, emergency scrambles in Japan’s southwestern airspace rose from 42 to 73, an increase of 73.8%.
II. The Operational Chain Formed by the Three Events
First layer: Constrain Taiwan’s armed forces through multi-axis activity around Taiwan

PLA aircraft entering Taiwan’s northern, central, southwestern, and eastern airspace at the same time are intended to force Taiwan’s armed forces to divide their surveillance and response resources. When the armed forces cannot determine in advance where the main pressure will come from, they must maintain radar surveillance, fighter readiness, naval deployments, and land-based missile alert status in multiple areas.

Over time, this kind of activity creates a continuing burden on flight hours, vessel availability, personnel rotations, and logistics and maintenance. Through routine activity at relatively low cost, Beijing imposes the higher cost of comprehensive readiness on Taiwan.
Second layer: Establish conditions for blockade and denial with an offshore formation

The destroyer and comprehensive replenishment ship passing through the Okinawa–Miyako waterway indicate that the PLA is strengthening its ability to sustain operations beyond the First Island Chain.

Destroyers provide air-defense and anti-ship firepower, while replenishment ships determine how long a fleet can remain at sea. When aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and replenishment ships can deploy for extended periods east of Taiwan or east of the Philippines, the PLA can apply pressure from Taiwan’s front while extending its reach to blocking U.S. and Japanese reinforcements and controlling access routes in the western Pacific.

The location and operating duration of replenishment ships therefore have greater warning value than a simple count of warships.
Third layer: Wear down Japan’s southwestern defense forces through high-frequency activity

Japan’s 73 emergency scrambles in southwestern airspace in October reflect how Chinese military aircraft are turning the airspace between Okinawa, Miyako Island, Yonaguni Island, and eastern Taiwan into a zone of frequent military encounters.

This area is an important route for the PLA to move from the East China Sea into the western Pacific. It is also a potential direction for U.S. and Japanese forces to support Taiwan. By continually increasing activity, Beijing can force Japan to commit more interception sorties, personnel, fuel, and maintenance resources, while collecting information on Japanese radar responses, fighter launch times, and interception procedures.

Taiwan and Japan now face interconnected security pressure across the First Island Chain.
III. Beijing’s Main Intentions
Compress Taiwan’s warning time

Unnamed, unannounced large-scale activities can reduce political visibility and make force buildups look more like routine training. If actual military operations use peacetime routes, formations, and activity patterns, it will be harder for Taiwan to determine when the PLA has shifted from exercises to operations.
Make the encirclement of Taiwan increasingly routine

Through activity from the north, center, southwest, and east, the PLA is making Taiwanese society increasingly accustomed to the military image of being surrounded. When abnormal force deployments are seen as routine, signs of genuine escalation are more likely to be underestimated.
Test the operational elements required for a blockade

Public information now shows multi-axis force deployments, offshore fleet activity, replenishment support, and frequent operations across the island chain. These activities are testing the force buildup, control of routes, sustained offshore support, and conditions for denying outside assistance that a blockade of Taiwan would require.
Wear down Taiwan’s and Japan’s readiness resources

By normalizing its activities, Beijing forces Taiwan and Japan to conduct frequent surveillance and interceptions, creating a long-term asymmetry in costs. China can choose when and on what scale to operate, while Taiwan and Japan must remain ready to handle the worst-case scenario.
IV. Assessment of PLA Capabilities in the Taiwan Strait
The PLA has developed a fairly mature ability to deploy forces from multiple directions and is gradually strengthening the ability of carrier formations, destroyers, and replenishment ships to operate continuously inside and beyond the First Island Chain. If the unnamed activity did involve three theater commands, that would also indicate that cross-theater coordination is becoming more operational in character.

Public information has not yet established that the PLA can block all of Taiwan’s maritime and air traffic for an extended period. Nor has there been evidence of sustained exclusion zones, inspections of merchant ships, comprehensive rerouting of traffic, or a complete cross-service firepower chain. The more accurate assessment at this stage is that the PLA has the conditions to impose a localized blockade and rapidly expand military pressure, while continuing to rehearse the command, logistics, and denial capabilities needed to shift toward a comprehensive blockade.

The major change in the threat is that the PLA has dispersed its blockade preparations across routine activities. A crisis in the Taiwan Strait may no longer begin with a publicly announced large-scale exercise; it could instead emerge from the rapid conversion of a series of seemingly routine activities by military aircraft, warships, coast guard vessels, and replenishment ships.
V. Taiwan’s Response
First, establish a warning mechanism for “unnamed exercises.” Readiness upgrades should no longer depend on whether Beijing announces an exercise name. Instead, they should be based on force concentration, replenishment-ship positions, rotation across multiple days, cross-theater coordination, and effects on civilian traffic.

Second, integrate activity by military aircraft, warships, coast guard vessels, and government vessels. The Ministry of National Defense, Coast Guard Administration, and national security agencies should establish shared incident identifiers and a common air and maritime picture, so that different agencies do not report fragments of the same activity separately and cause the overall threat to be underestimated.

Third, strengthen the protection of eastern Taiwan and external assistance routes. Eastern bases, ports, undersea cables, energy facilities, and external sea routes should be incorporated into planning for counter-blockade operations, dispersed deployment, and sustained operations.

Fourth, track PLA replenishment and support platforms. The forward deployment of early warning aircraft, aerial refueling aircraft, comprehensive replenishment ships, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and command-and-communications platforms can indicate whether the PLA is preparing to extend an operation more clearly than the total number of aircraft and warships alone.

Fifth, deepen intelligence sharing among Taiwan, Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. Taiwan should promote a shared air and maritime picture for the First Island Chain to track fleet transits through waterways, drone activity, submarine movements, and replenishment points at an early stage, reducing delays caused by countries making assessments separately.

From Multi-Axis Pressure Around Taiwan to a First Island Chain War of Attrition: Beijing Is Building a Low-Warning Blockade Posture

Taken together, these three events show that Beijing’s military pressure on Taiwan is shifting from one-off exercises toward low-warning, cross-regional preparations for a blockade that can be sustained over time.

The PLA constrains Taiwan’s armed forces through multi-axis activity around the island, extends beyond the First Island Chain with aircraft carriers, destroyers, and replenishment ships, and wears down Japan’s southwestern defense forces through high-frequency air activity. Together, these form a strategic structure of “inner-layer encirclement, outer-layer denial, and regional attrition.”

Taiwan must adjust its approach to warning. The signals that truly require attention are whether forces are concentrating, replenishment is moving forward, cross-theater command is being activated, and maritime or air traffic is actually being disrupted. When these conditions appear together, Beijing may already have entered a substantive stage of operational preparation even without announcing an exercise.

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馬依翔 MA, I-HSIANG

Air Force Reserve Colonel · Korea Scholar · Public Affairs

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