Ma seal script emblem馬依翔MA, I-HSIANG
國家安全INSIGHT / PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Why Does China Keep Operating in the Waters Southwest of Taiwan? From Air and Sea Drills to Surveying off Kaohsiung

國家安全# 台灣國防# 海上封鎖# 中共軍事活動# 海洋調查# 海巡執法

China has repeatedly held exercises southwest of Taiwan, while a research vessel has also operated off Kaohsiung. Ma Yi-hsiang examines the strategic significance of the southern entrance to the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel, and waters off Kaohsiung, and how vessel tracks, survey records, and enforcement responses can help assess Beijing’s actions.

On November 3, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that between 6 a.m. on November 2 and 6 a.m. on November 3, it had detected 49 sorties by Chinese military aircraft, six Chinese military vessels, and six official vessels around Taiwan. Of the aircraft sorties, 31 entered Taiwan’s central, southwestern, and eastern air defense identification zones. The equivalent figure for the previous day was 19 sorties. Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo said the armed forces had tracked Chinese military exercises in the southwest and were continuing to monitor them.

At about 3 p.m. on November 3, the Chinese research vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 arrived about 61 nautical miles southwest of Kaohsiung Port, accompanied by four Chinese fishing boats. The Coast Guard Administration said the research vessel deployed an unidentified instrument from its stern. The Tainan vessel immediately sailed alongside to monitor it and broadcast requests in Chinese and English for it to leave. The Coast Guard determined that the flotilla was operating without authorization within Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone and identified the four accompanying fishing boats as maritime militia vessels. When the Coast Guard issued its report, the two sides were still facing off.

My assessment is that Beijing is cultivating operational options in the southwest for a crisis. Repeated Chinese military exercises can familiarize its forces with moving in and out of the area and with Taiwan’s responses. The research vessel’s continued operations may accumulate data on the marine environment, while also giving China opportunities to observe how Taiwan’s Coast Guard identifies, approaches, and halts such activity. The strategic effects of these activities can reinforce one another. To understand why Beijing has sustained its presence in this direction, we must first look at the geography.
Why the Southwest? Three Strategic Locations, Three Different Roles
The southern entrance to the Taiwan Strait matters for how forces move from the South China Sea into the Taiwan Strait. Repeated Chinese military activity in the southwest can familiarize forces with how different aircraft and vessels enter, exit, and follow one another. It can also reveal when Taiwan detects them, how it identifies them, and how it deploys forces to monitor them. For Beijing, the peacetime value of repeated sorties lies in turning routes and response scenarios that would otherwise require ad hoc planning into missions that units have experience carrying out. For Taiwan, if activity in the southwest continues for longer periods, the burden of maintaining alert and duty rotations also grows.

The Bashi Channel provides a route eastward into the western Pacific. Chinese forces have previously sailed through the channel between the South China Sea and waters off eastern Taiwan. The military value of the southwest is that forces can move north into the Taiwan Strait as circumstances dictate, or head east through the Bashi Channel into the western Pacific. For Taiwan’s defense, where a force that appears in the southwest goes next directly affects subsequent monitoring and force deployment. That is why the direction of activity, the point at which vessels turn back, and the time they remain in the area often reveal more about what China is practicing than the number of sorties on a single day.

Offshore waters near Kaohsiung Port connect military pressure directly to daily life and logistics. Kaohsiung Port is Taiwan’s largest international commercial port, and its offshore waters are used by both commercial vessels and fishing boats. The Coast Guard Administration said it had helped handle an October 15 incident in which a Taiwanese fishing boat’s net was allegedly damaged by Haiyang Dizhi 8. On October 18, it again dispatched a vessel after the research ship and accompanying boats interfered with Taiwanese fishing operations. The November 3 deployment took place about 61 nautical miles southwest of Kaohsiung Port and 26 nautical miles outside the restricted waters cited by the Coast Guard. This location makes the flotilla’s actual conduct the central enforcement issue. The Coast Guard must establish what it deployed, how long it operated, and whether it stopped, while also maintaining the safety of nearby vessels.
What Can a Research Vessel Accumulate? The Key Is Where and How Often It Surveys
If maritime surveys collect data such as seabed topography, water temperature, or salinity, that information may be used for civilian research, but could also inform underwater navigation planning and assessments of sonar detection conditions. Repeated measurements are particularly worth noting in the southwestern waters. Measurements of the same waters at different times can gradually fill gaps in environmental information. Whether a vessel repeatedly returns to the same area and operates along similar routes can help determine what it is accumulating more than a single instrument deployment can. The Coast Guard’s current report provides the deployment’s location and time; the instrument type, the data collected, and where the data will go have yet to be identified.

The Chinese military exercises and the research vessel’s operations can be assessed as part of the same strategic direction. The military is accumulating experience in using these routes, moving forces, and observing Taiwan’s responses. If the research vessel conducts repeated surveys, it may be accumulating environmental data needed to operate in these waters. As for whether this round involved coordinated missions, the Ministry of National Defense’s aircraft and vessel figures ended at 6 a.m. on November 3, while the research vessel deployed its instrument at about 3 p.m. The next step is to compare tracks, time spent in the area, and task assignments during the same period to determine whether there was naval protection, a handover of monitoring, or other verifiable coordination.

Why Does China Keep Operating in the Waters Southwest of Taiwan? From Air and Sea Drills to Surveying off Kaohsiung

The Ministry of National Defense and the Coast Guard Administration should compare activity off Kaohsiung Port, at the southern entrance to the Taiwan Strait, and in the direction of the Bashi Channel along a shared timeline. Military records can help identify how forces enter and exit, and whether activity continues across multiple days. Coast Guard records should preserve the research vessel’s position while stopped, the times it deploys and retrieves equipment, the movements of accompanying vessels, and the results of broadcast warnings and responses. If the same flotilla appears again, frontline personnel will have a previous case for comparison, enabling them to identify its operating pattern earlier and warn nearby fishing boats sooner.

The legislature can ask the Ocean Affairs Council and the Ministry of National Defense to provide regular updates on three outcomes: when the research vessel stopped operating, whether it returned to the same survey area, and what assistance was provided to Taiwanese fishers affected by interference. For fishers, there should be clear channels for reporting, evidence collection, and follow-up assistance. For the armed forces and Coast Guard, records spanning multiple days should be used to track whether China gradually extends its time in the area, establishes fixed operating zones, or increases coordination among different vessels and aircraft. These changes are the basis for judging whether Beijing is advancing its operational capabilities in the southwest.

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馬依翔 MA, I-HSIANG

Air Force Reserve Colonel · Korea Scholar · Public Affairs

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