On November 12, Japan’s Joint Staff announced that it had detected a suspected Chinese drone flying in from the East China Sea that morning, crossing the waterway between Taiwan and Yonaguni Island and entering the Pacific. In the afternoon, another suspected Chinese drone crossed the same waterway in the opposite direction, returning to the East China Sea from the Pacific. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s Southwestern Air Defense Force scrambled aircraft in response. Japan’s announcement did not confirm whether the morning and afternoon flights involved the same drone, and did not disclose the aircraft type.
This was the second consecutive day of related activity. On November 11, Japan’s Joint Staff had just announced the movements of a BZK-005 and other suspected Chinese drones; on November 12, crossings in both directions were reported. Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper also notes that Chinese drones have frequently passed in recent years through the waterways between Taiwan and Yonaguni, and between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island. Japan publicly recorded 16 Chinese drone activities in fiscal year 2025, and some models have reconnaissance and attack capabilities.
On the same day, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected, from 9:38 a.m., 29 sorties of PLA aircraft and drones, including J-10s, J-16s, JH-7s, KJ-500s, Y-20 tankers, and unmanned aircraft. Of these, 22 sorties crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and its extension, entering airspace north, central, southwest, and east of Taiwan, and conducted joint combat readiness patrols with PLA naval vessels.
Large-scale air and naval patrols are taking place to the west, while drones are repeatedly crossing the First Island Chain’s gap to the east. Public information does not yet establish that both activities were directly directed by the same order, but their strategic objectives are clearly aligned: to establish multi-axis reconnaissance capabilities around Taiwan, test Taiwan and Japan’s responses, and gradually bring the air and sea around eastern Taiwan into the PLA’s routine operational area.
What Are the Drones Collecting?
The value of drones goes beyond taking photographs. Long-duration, repeated use of the same routes can help the PLA record Taiwan’s and Japan’s radar activation patterns, aircraft scramble times, interception directions, command communications, and handovers between areas of responsibility.
Every flight may become an intelligence-gathering mission:
1. Where Taiwan and Japan detect the target on radar.
2. From which bases fighter aircraft take off, and how quickly.
3. Which segments Taiwan monitors and which Japan takes over.
4. What signatures are produced by radar, communications, and electronic jamming systems.
5. How civil aviation and maritime traffic respond to military activity.
If accumulated over time, these data can be used to update the PLA’s electronic intelligence databases, plan low-observability routes, and support wartime target identification, maritime search, and fires. A single drone activity may not constitute an immediate attack, but repeated flights can gradually improve battlefield preparations.
Why Choose the Waterway Between Taiwan and Yonaguni?
The waterway between Taiwan and Yonaguni Island is an important route for Chinese military aircraft entering and leaving eastern Taiwan and the western Pacific, as well as a key gap at the southern end of the First Island Chain.
After entering the Pacific through this waterway, the PLA can head north toward the Miyako Strait and the Ryukyu Islands, south toward the Bashi Channel and northern Luzon, or west to monitor the airspace east of Taiwan and bases in Hualien and Taitung. This route also involves the operational space of Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. military in the western Pacific.
Eastern Taiwan has long been regarded as an important direction for preserving combat capabilities, receiving external support, and maintaining air and sea traffic. By expanding drone activity to the east, the CCP seeks to force Taiwan’s armed forces to face both pressure from crossings in the west and reconnaissance threats in the east, increasing the burden on radar, aircraft, ships, air-defense missiles, and personnel rotations.
Low-Cost Drones Are Consuming High-Cost Readiness Resources
Drones can remain airborne for long periods, pose little risk to personnel, cost relatively little, and offer flexible missions. The CCP can repeatedly dispatch drones to test Taiwan and Japan’s responses. If Taiwan and Japan use crewed fighter aircraft to intercept them throughout every flight, they will incur greater fuel, spare-parts, flight-hour, and personnel costs.
This is the cost logic of gray-zone operations: the CCP uses relatively low-cost platforms to force the defenders to commit high-cost resources over the long term.
Taiwan needs a tiered response system. Crewed fighters must retain the ability to handle high-threat targets, but drone surveillance, ground-based radar, passive sensors, electronic warfare, and intelligence sharing with allies should also contribute to tracking.
Taiwan Must Move Beyond “Detecting Targets” to Understanding the “Mission Chain”
Future threat assessments cannot focus only on the number of PLA aircraft deployed. What truly matters is whether the mission chain is gradually closing.
The KJ-500 provides airborne early warning and command; the Y-20 extends the time fighter aircraft can operate; drones conduct long-duration reconnaissance; fighters provide air superiority and escort; and the JH-7 has ground- and sea-strike capabilities. When these platforms and surface vessels operate simultaneously in different directions, the PLA is testing an operational system that encompasses reconnaissance, command, support, and strike.
There is currently no public evidence that the PLA has completed a cross-service firepower chain, nor have no-sail zones, live-fire exercises, or actual interruptions to traffic occurred. But the CCP is accumulating the route, electromagnetic, and response data needed to complete this capability. That is the substantive threat posed by this activity.
Taiwan Should Take Five Steps Immediately
First, establish a unified picture of PLA activity to the west and east of Taiwan, integrating data on military aircraft, drones, warships, coast guard vessels, civil aviation, and merchant ships.
Second, establish a regular mechanism with Japan for exchanging flight paths, timing, radar, and emergency-scramble information, in order to track Chinese military aircraft activity before and after they cross the First Island Chain.
Third, strengthen the dispersal, camouflage, redundancy, and rapid-repair capabilities of eastern bases, command centers, radar, fuel and ammunition depots, and communications nodes.
Fourth, develop low-cost counter-drone measures, including passive radar, electronic jamming, ground-based air defense, and domestically produced drones that can fly alongside and monitor targets, reducing the burden of long-term crewed-fighter deployments.
Fifth, regularly publish statistics on activity along eastern routes that do not involve classified information, so the international community understands that Chinese activity concerns the First Island Chain, regional stability, and the safety of international navigation.
Conclusion
Chinese drones crossing the waterway between Taiwan and Yonaguni Island are gradually shifting from isolated incidents to repeated, two-way, and routine activity.
The CCP’s objectives are clear: learn how Taiwan and Japan respond to air-defense threats, establish fixed routes into and out of the western Pacific, and bring eastern Taiwan within its scope of continuous surveillance and military pressure.
Taiwan must treat every drone activity as part of the other side’s intelligence cycle. Publishing only numbers and flight paths is not enough. We need to track what the drones collect, which forces they support, whether they form a mission chain with warships and early-warning aircraft, and how Taiwan and Japan can jointly reduce intelligence exposure and readiness costs.
References
- Taiwan Ministry of National Defense: Explanation of the PLA joint combat readiness patrol on November 12
- Japan Ministry of Defense Joint Staff: Movements of suspected Chinese drones on November 12
- Japan Ministry of Defense Joint Staff press release materials