1. Modern Maritime Competition Revealed by the Iran Blockade
On July 14, 2026, the U.S. military resumed its maritime blockade of Iran, seeking to further constrain Iran’s economic activity and ability to trade with the outside world through maritime traffic controls and limits on energy transportation. According to public information, by October 11, 135 merchant ships had turned back because of the blockade, while four vessels had been disabled and two boarded for inspection. Energy market intelligence company Kpler estimated that Iran’s crude oil exports had fallen to zero in September, indicating that U.S. restrictions on bulk crude oil transportation had had a significant effect.
However, an investigation published by Reuters on October 16 found that small quantities of Iranian energy products continued to flow overseas. According to vessel-tracking data from the U.S. advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), since mid-July at least eight vessels carrying Iranian liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) had departed the Gulf of Oman, with an estimated volume of about 4.1 million barrels. Analysis by maritime intelligence company SynMax also indicated that a vessel carrying Iranian aviation fuel had arrived in Myanmar in September. Reuters further cross-checked the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions list and found that six of the eight LPG vessels, as well as the aviation-fuel vessel, were under U.S. sanctions.
The activity of these vessels reflects the enforcement challenges facing modern maritime blockades. Large crude oil tankers require corresponding port-loading and unloading facilities, and their routes and cargo transactions are also easier to track. By contrast, small LPG carriers and product tankers can adjust their routes more flexibly. Some vessels may make ship-to-ship transfers off Oman or conduct transshipment at Malaysia’s Eastern Outer Port Limits (EOPL), making it harder to identify cargo origins and final destinations. Some vessels may also use irregular Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals or changes in flag and ownership to complicate enforcement agencies’ assessments.
Of course, a vessel passing through a blockade line cannot automatically be considered to have successfully breached the blockade. Some voyages may have been authorized after U.S. review, while vessel positions and cargo origins may be misread because of AIS spoofing or multiple transshipments. The conclusion best supported by the available information is therefore that the U.S. military has severely constrained Iran’s bulk energy exports, but that limited channels for transporting products remain.
From a military-strategic perspective, the effectiveness of a maritime blockade must be assessed in terms of physical interdiction, economic pressure, and the cost of sustained enforcement. Even if the blockading force does not intercept every merchant ship, it may still achieve important strategic aims by forcing major energy exports to stop, raising transportation costs, and restricting financial transactions. On the other hand, the blockading force must continuously commit naval forces, maritime patrol aircraft, satellite reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, and logistical support to maintain the blockade’s intensity. The longer the blockade lasts, the more its enforcement costs, international political pressure, and commercial shipping disputes may grow.
The Iran case therefore offers an important observation: modern maritime blockades have expanded beyond the traditional interception of ships by warships to encompass global shipping, finance, insurance, and intelligence-identification systems. The ability to control maritime traffic is becoming an important strategic instrument that combines military and economic power.
Iran and Taiwan have markedly different energy structures. Iran has abundant oil and natural gas resources, and energy exports are an important source of national revenue. The U.S. blockade primarily exerts economic pressure on Iran by restricting exports and foreign-exchange income. Taiwan, by contrast, depends heavily on imported energy. Restrictions on maritime traffic would first trigger cascading effects on energy supply, industrial production, electricity dispatch, and military logistics.
According to the Energy Administration of the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ 2025 energy statistics, Taiwan’s energy import dependency was about 94.6%. Oil accounted for about 44.4% of energy supply, coal about 26.6%, and natural gas about 23.6%. In the electricity mix, gas-fired generation accounted for about 47.7% in 2025, and coal-fired generation about 35.3%. These figures show that Taiwan’s economic activity and electricity supply depend heavily on energy delivered by sea.
In peacetime, the government can reduce the risk of supply disruptions through long-term procurement contracts, diversification of supply sources, and adjustments in international energy markets. But if a military blockade, restrictions on sea lanes, or a sustained military threat emerges around the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan may not be able to ensure that energy vessels reach its ports on schedule, even if it has sufficient funds to purchase energy. The energy-security challenge would shift from whether supplies are available on international markets to whether the country can maintain the maritime transportation, reception, storage, and distribution capabilities it needs.
It is particularly important to note that China’s maritime coercion against Taiwan may not begin with a comprehensive military blockade. Beijing could first use coast guard enforcement, inspections in designated waters, military exercises, temporary navigation bans, and other gray-zone measures to raise the risks for merchant ships entering and leaving Taiwan’s ports. Even without directly intercepting every energy vessel, shipping companies might change routes or cancel voyages because of higher war-risk insurance premiums, crew-safety concerns, and contractual liabilities.
In such circumstances, the impact on energy supplies may begin before a full blockade is actually in place. If Taiwan uses only the closure of ports or the interception of energy vessels as its criteria for identifying a crisis, it may underestimate the pressure that maritime coercion can place on the domestic energy market and public confidence.
Taiwan’s strategic energy planning should cover three scenarios: disruption of international supply chains, partial restrictions on maritime traffic, and a sustained military blockade. Each scenario requires different measures for energy dispatch, military response, and international cooperation, as well as corresponding crisis-warning and decision-making mechanisms.
3. Natural Gas Reserves and the Strategic Vulnerability of Taiwan’s Power System
Natural gas is one of the areas of energy security that Taiwan most needs to examine as a priority. As the share of gas-fired generation in the overall electricity mix continues to rise, the stability of natural gas supplies directly affects the operation of the domestic power system.
According to information released by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in April 2026, Taiwan’s current natural gas safety-stock requirement is at least 11 days, with plans to raise it to 14 days in 2027. In recent years, the government has continued to promote the construction of LNG receiving terminals, storage tanks, and gas pipeline networks in order to increase supply capacity and dispatch flexibility. These measures help improve energy supply in peacetime, but wartime energy security still requires further assessment.
First, the calculation of natural gas safety stocks primarily reflects reserve capacity under a particular set of statistical definitions. In an actual blockade, how long natural gas can sustain the country would still depend on demand at the time, usable storage capacity, the operational status of receiving terminals, the integrity of the gas pipeline network, and the government’s demand-management measures. Even if the country’s total natural gas stocks meet the standard, the inability of some key receiving terminals or pipelines to operate normally could still cause supply difficulties in particular areas.
Second, natural gas has different storage and transportation requirements from oil and coal. Liquefied natural gas requires low-temperature storage and dedicated receiving facilities, and cannot be moved freely to other storage sites at short notice. If energy infrastructure is also affected by military attacks or major disasters, there could be a significant gap between inventory levels and the amount actually available for use.
I therefore believe Taiwan should move beyond assessing energy security solely in terms of days of inventory and adopt the concept of “days of sustainable energy services in wartime.” For different crisis scenarios, the government must calculate how much essential electricity and fuel the country could continue to provide after energy imports are interrupted, some facilities are damaged, and demand controls are introduced—and for how long.
For example, if some natural gas receiving terminals cannot operate, can the government still meet the electricity needs of military bases, hospitals, communications centers, water-supply facilities, and important transport systems? How would electricity dispatch be adjusted if natural gas supplies fell by 30% or 50%, or if imports stopped altogether? Which industries must be kept operating as a priority, and which nonessential uses of electricity can be temporarily reduced?
The Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan Power Company, CPC Corporation, Taiwan, and relevant agencies need to produce specific scenario analyses on these questions and verify their feasibility through regular exercises. The government should also establish minimum service levels for different energy products so that the allocation order does not have to be decided on an ad hoc basis after a crisis begins.
4. Energy Security Should Be Included in Assessments of the Armed Forces’ Ability to Sustain Operations
From a professional military perspective, energy assurance is as strategically important as the serviceability of weapons and equipment, ammunition stocks, and unit staffing levels. Modern armed forces depend heavily on fuel, electricity, and logistical transportation. A serious shortfall in any one of these supplies can directly limit operational capability.
Air force aircraft need aviation fuel to maintain sortie generation; naval vessels need fuel to sustain deployments; and army mobile units rely on vehicle fuel and logistical transportation. Military bases, radar stations, command-and-communications systems, and key logistical facilities also need reliable electricity and backup generation.
The case of Iranian aviation fuel being shipped overseas reminds us to pay closer attention to the military uses of different energy products. Aviation fuel, diesel, naval fuel, and fuel for power-generation equipment each have different supply conditions and limits on substitution. Even if a country has substantial oil reserves, it does not follow that all military fuels have the same degree of supply assurance.
I believe the armed forces should formally incorporate energy assurance into the overall force-building and readiness principles of “operations, equipment, organization, and training.”
In operational planning, the energy consumption requirements for different phases of operations and the ability to sustain operations when resupply is constrained should be identified. Equipment readiness reviews must also examine the reliability of fuel storage, transportation, refueling, and backup equipment. Force organization should ensure that logistics, transportation, fuel, and maintenance personnel are sufficient to support prolonged missions. Education and training should include scenarios involving interrupted energy supplies, blocked transport routes, and damage to key facilities.
These matters involve sensitive national defense information, and relevant data and deployment details should be protected by law. However, whether the systems are in place, whether exercises are conducted regularly, and whether interagency coordination is effective should remain subject to appropriate democratic oversight.
Taiwan’s military and civilian energy systems are also closely connected. The Ministry of National Defense should establish a regular civil-military energy assurance mechanism with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, clearly distinguishing peacetime supply from wartime priorities and planning in advance for emergency resupply, coordination of transportation resources, and procedures for repairing key facilities.
The government’s substantial investment in defense budgets to procure advanced weapons and equipment must be matched by ensuring that logistical energy can support those systems in carrying out their missions over time. Weapon performance, equipment serviceability, and energy assurance should all be included in assessments of the armed forces’ combat capability.
5. Energy Diversification and the Protection of National Critical Infrastructure
Taiwan’s current energy system remains highly dependent on large power plants, LNG receiving terminals, ports, and high-voltage transmission facilities. A centralized energy system offers economies of scale and management efficiency, but severe damage to certain key facilities could trigger cascading effects on energy supplies across a region or even the entire country.
Future energy policy should give greater attention to distributed supply and the capacity for autonomous regional operation, reducing the impact of the failure of any single key facility.
Distributed energy can combine solar photovoltaics, energy storage, microgrids, and backup generation systems, with priority deployment at hospitals, disaster-response centers, important communications facilities, water-supply systems, and other critical public-service sites. If the external grid fails, some facilities can maintain essential functions through islanded operation, buying time for repairs and restoration of power.
However, distributed energy has technical limitations. Solar photovoltaics are affected by sunlight conditions, while energy storage is limited by capacity and discharge duration. These systems must be paired with reliable dispatchable power sources, demand management, and regular maintenance to provide genuine backup capability.
Taiwan’s energy policy should therefore not rely solely on the generation cost or installed capacity of any single technology as its assessment criteria. Natural gas, coal, renewable energy, energy storage, and nuclear options that meet legal operating requirements should all be included in comparisons of energy security. Assessments should consider fuel availability, domestic reserves, facility safety, environmental impact, repair capacity, and capacity available for use during wartime.
The nuclear energy issue in particular requires a comprehensive assessment that considers safety, nuclear waste management, regulations, social consensus, and energy resilience. Nuclear power has characteristics such as high fuel energy density and long refueling intervals, but large nuclear facilities still face issues involving major-accident protection, cooling systems, and the security of external power supplies. Whether to use nuclear energy should be judged on the basis of specific technical conditions and the country’s overall energy strategy.
What Taiwan needs is an energy mix whose components can support one another. When some energy sources or facilities are restricted, other energy systems should have a degree of supplementary and backup capacity, reducing systemic risks to the country during a crisis.
6. The Economic Pressure of a Maritime Blockade and International Energy Cooperation
The Iran case shows that the effects of a maritime blockade also depend on how the international commercial shipping system responds. Whether merchant ships can continue sailing depends not only on military threats, but also on insurance premiums, bank financing, port services, crew safety, and cargo contracts.
Even without completely cutting off all maritime traffic, China could increase the cost and risk of merchant ships entering and leaving Taiwan’s ports through limited military action or maritime law-enforcement measures. Some shipping companies might suspend services as a result, while energy suppliers might adjust delivery arrangements.
Taiwan’s preparations for resisting a blockade must account for shipping insurance, financial transactions, and international commercial confidence. The government should establish crisis communication channels in advance with major energy suppliers, shipping operators, and international financial institutions, and consider shipping support, risk-sharing, and energy-dispatch measures that might be needed.
Japan and South Korea also depend heavily on maritime energy transportation and share significant interests with Taiwan. The three parties could seek cooperation on energy supply security, the exchange of shipping information, alternative routes, and emergency allocation. The United States and other major energy-exporting countries can also be important partners in building Taiwan’s supply-chain resilience.
However, international mutual assistance in energy has practical limits. If a major military crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, neighboring countries may simultaneously face rising energy prices, disrupted shipping, and pressure on domestic supplies. The amount of support governments can provide will still depend on their own energy needs, political decisions, and security environments.
Taiwan must therefore build on domestic energy reserves and the capacity to sustain itself, then use international cooperation to expand its room for crisis response. External cooperation can make energy security more flexible, but it cannot replace the country’s necessary strategic preparations.
7. Establishing a Cross-Ministerial National Energy Security Strategy
Taiwan’s energy policy currently involves the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of Environment, Financial Supervisory Commission, and other relevant agencies. Each agency handles energy supply, military requirements, transport security, financial markets, and related matters according to its own responsibilities.
However, the effects of a maritime blockade cut across sectors, and no single agency can address them independently. If an energy vessel cannot arrive at port on schedule, the resulting problems may involve maritime security, international procurement, electricity dispatch, civilian supply, military resupply, and financial transactions at the same time. Without a clear command and coordination mechanism across agencies, crisis response may be delayed.
I advocate that the Executive Yuan integrate existing energy policies with the whole-of-society defense resilience framework to establish a national energy security strategy with clearly defined implementation responsibilities, making the sustained supply of energy during wartime a core objective.
First, the government should establish minimum service levels for scenarios involving an energy blockade, setting necessary energy-supply standards for national defense, healthcare, communications, water supply, transportation, and key industries. These standards should be coordinated with existing energy reserves, power-grid dispatch, and civilian demand-management systems.
Second, the government should regularly review the reserve capacity of natural gas, oil, coal, and other important energy products, and include the availability of receiving facilities, transport pipelines, and distribution systems in its assessments. Increasing reserves alone may not produce the intended security benefits if the corresponding distribution and dispatch capabilities are lacking.
Third, the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Economic Affairs should establish a standing coordination mechanism for military energy assurance, ensuring that wartime military requirements are aligned with national energy dispatch and preventing different agencies from competing for limited resources during a crisis.
Fourth, the government should promote backup energy systems at critical public facilities and test their actual operating capability through regular exercises. The number of backup systems installed reflects only implementation progress. What really needs to be tested is whether they can maintain essential services when external supplies are interrupted, and for how long.
Finally, the Executive Yuan should regularly conduct cross-ministerial energy-blockade tabletop exercises, simulating scenarios such as delayed energy vessels, unavailable war-risk insurance, port operations being disrupted, reduced natural gas supplies, and damage to critical power facilities. The results should lead to specific improvement plans and be subject to Legislative Yuan review through appropriate public reporting and oversight processes that protect classified information.
This work requires long-term institutionalization, stable budgets, and coordination across ministries. Energy security should be an important issue in national security decision-making and should be incorporated into the overall defense strategy and government performance assessments.
8. Conclusion: Redefining Energy Security Around Wartime Continuity
The fact that small quantities of energy products continued to leave Iran under the U.S. maritime blockade shows that modern blockades face enforcement limitations and complex gray areas in shipping. At the same time, the severe constraint on bulk crude oil exports demonstrates that a maritime blockade can have a major impact on a country’s economic activity.
For Taiwan, the important lesson is that disruptions to maritime traffic can trigger cascading effects on energy supplies, industrial production, financial markets, and military logistics. Taiwan’s energy import dependency exceeds 90%, making national security highly interconnected with maritime transportation.
Taiwan has continued to increase its defense budget, strengthen weapons and equipment, and promote whole-of-society defense resilience in recent years. All these policies require stable energy supplies as their foundation. When the country faces a prolonged crisis or military conflict, its ability to supply energy will directly affect the armed forces’ ability to sustain operations, the government’s ability to manage a crisis, and society’s capacity to maintain basic functions.
I believe Taiwan’s future energy policy must formally incorporate national defense and wartime continuity requirements alongside existing goals of supply stability, generation costs, and environmental sustainability. The government should establish energy security indicators that can be quantified, exercised, and overseen, and gradually address vulnerabilities in the existing energy system through interagency coordination and international cooperation.
Taiwan also needs to answer a more complete version of one question: if maritime energy transportation is seriously disrupted, how much essential electricity, fuel, and public service can the country maintain, and for how long?
This question concerns energy policy, but also defense strategy, industrial security, and the government’s capacity to govern. Future assessments of Taiwan’s energy security should be based on actual capacity to sustain operations under different blockade scenarios, providing a shared planning foundation for energy investment, strategic reserves, defense logistics, and international cooperation.
Energy resilience is an important foundation of national defense capability. Taiwan must put the necessary systems, facilities, and international cooperation in place in peacetime so that, when a crisis occurs, it can maintain essential national functions and preserve its capacity for sustained defense and policy autonomy.
References:
Reuters (October 16, 2026), investigative report on Iranian LPG and aviation fuel shipments overseas.
United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), data on Iranian energy transport and vessel tracking.
SynMax, maritime satellite imagery and vessel-activity analysis.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), public information on the maritime blockade of Iran.
Energy Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Energy Statistics Annual Report and 2025 energy supply-and-demand statistics.
Ministry of Economic Affairs (April 14, 2026), information on natural gas supply and safety stocks.
Auditor General, audit reports on natural gas storage capacity and energy safety stocks.
International Energy Agency (IEA), research on energy security and emergency oil stocks.
Research note: This article was written based on public information available through October 24, 2026, and the supplied summary of the Reuters investigation. The Iranian vessel-shipment data remain subject to uncertainty in interpreting vessel tracks and cargo origins; discussion of a blockade of the Taiwan Strait is strategic scenario analysis and policy analysis.