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國防政策INSIGHT / PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Extending Air Force Pilots’ Service to 58: From Retention to a Reserve Flight Operations Force

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Extending pilots’ service to age 58 should be planned alongside command succession, promotion pathways, junior officer development, and air defense needs. Ma Yi-Hsiang proposes integrating active-duty specialist pilots, a reserve flight operations force, and civilian career pathways, using ongoing training and mission certification to turn experienced pilots’ expertise into sustainable operational capability.

The Ministry of National Defense’s plan to extend Air Force pilots’ service to age 58 touches on a long-standing institutional tension in Taiwan’s Air Force: the state invests considerable time and resources in training pilots, yet when they have gained mature experience, rank, years of service, and career arrangements may lead them to leave. Extending the service age can offer a new retention option, but the policy’s value must be assessed in the context of the Air Force’s overall personnel structure and defense missions. How experienced pilots can continue to contribute, how younger officers can develop, and how retired pilots can maintain ties with their units should all be planned together.

According to the Ministry of National Defense’s public briefing to the Legislative Yuan on October 12, 2026, the “Measures for Employing Air Force Specialist Flight Officers” had been submitted to the Executive Yuan for review on September 4. The plan is to retain, through a special increase in authorized positions, 72 colonel and lieutenant-colonel flight officers with at least 14 years of service and the requisite qualifications and experience. They would retain their current ranks, extend service to age 58 if they choose, and be covered by adjusted rules for incentives and aircrew allowances. This article analyzes that publicly announced proposal; actual eligibility, rights, and obligations remain subject to subsequent approval and formal regulations.[1]

The policy has a reasonable basis. Recruiting and training new pilots, followed by conversion to a specific aircraft type, requires sustained investment in training resources. Pilots with mission experience can also help guide newcomers as they develop. At the time, the Ministry of National Defense reported that the filled-to-authorized ratio for flight personnel was 87.8%, but a single ratio cannot show differences among aircraft types, mission qualifications, and instructor staffing. Even if total personnel numbers are close to authorized levels, there may still be shortages in particular aircraft types or qualification tiers. Retention planning should therefore examine personnel by mission and qualification, assessing how much additional readiness and training capacity each group can provide.[1]

Concerns raised by some frontline officers about the extension policy focus on rank management, promotion, and work assignments. These views should inform the design of the system, but they do not justify treating all senior personnel as a management burden, nor should military flying ability be judged by whether someone has passed airline recruitment. Civil aviation and military aviation have different selection criteria, missions, and career requirements. The military should use its own professional assessments to identify the personnel it needs. Whether experienced flight personnel are concentrated mainly at the major and lieutenant-colonel levels should also be verified using data on aircraft types, mission qualifications, years of service, and actual workloads, rather than allowing individual experience to substitute for an overall assessment.

As a matter of policy, I propose first assessing major and lieutenant-colonel personnel who directly perform flying, instructional flying, and teaching duties as the priority group for retention, while establishing separate professional and command career tracks. Retaining colonels should require a clear statement of the specialist need and the reason for the position, explaining what gap their expertise would fill. Rank arrangements must meet organizational needs, and pilots choosing specialist flying roles should fully understand how their promotion prospects, compensation, and responsibilities would change.

The Ministry of National Defense has emphasized that flight personnel must undergo annual aircrew medical examinations and regular refresher training in aviation physiology, physical fitness, and G-forces; those who fail cannot continue frontline flying duties. This is a key precondition for extending service.[2] Building on this, the Air Force should establish ongoing fitness assessments by aircraft type and mission, covering recent flying proficiency, professional evaluations, instructional ability, and work performance. Age 58 should be the service limit for those who meet the requirements; whether each person can continue undertaking missions at any given stage should still be subject to the relevant review.

Unit management also requires concrete rules. Senior pilots working alongside younger commanders can bring complementary experience; the real issue to address is conflict between formal authority and informal seniority. It must be clear who assigns missions, who conducts evaluations, who can require improvement, and who decides on reassignment when standards are not met. Younger commanders should have management authority commensurate with their responsibilities, while senior pilots should have clear and fair procedures for professional evaluation and appeal. Seniority-based customs must not become a reason to evade assessment.

Promotion issues must be considered in terms of both authorized positions and actual operations. The Ministry of National Defense’s proposal involves a special increase in authorized positions, so it cannot be assumed that service extensions will necessarily occupy existing promotion vacancies. However, the increase may still affect flying training hours, instructor assignments, opportunities to gain experience, and the allocation of management roles. The system must track these changes and ensure that younger personnel can still obtain the qualifications and experience they need and compete for promotion on merit after senior personnel are retained.

Another easily overlooked issue is the transfer of lower-level duties. If specialist flight personnel focus on flying and instruction, their existing administrative, duty, and troop-leading work must be reassigned. If these responsibilities remain concentrated among a small number of younger officers without corresponding positions and resources, their views of the retention system will be affected. Personnel assessments for the service-extension policy should therefore cover the workload of the entire unit and include the departure and retention of junior officers, instructor development, and succession among commanders.

The continuity of specialist personnel should also extend beyond retirement. In addition to extending active service, I propose that the Ministry of National Defense assess expanding the use of the Reserve Warrior program to include retired pilots who are qualified, willing, and able to continue training, gradually establishing a dedicated “Reserve Flight Operations Force.” For pilots seeking a career change while remaining willing to serve the country, this would provide another way to contribute to air defense over the long term.

There is already a partial institutional basis for this proposal. The Reserve Command’s publicly released 2025 Reserve Warrior recruitment plan listed eight Air Force pilots, with specialties including high-speed fixed-wing, low-speed fixed-wing, and rotary-wing flying officers.[3] This was a recruitment plan for that year. It does not establish that the same number of personnel currently maintain operational qualifications, nor does it indicate that a dedicated reserve flight operations force already exists. It does, however, show that bringing retired aviation professionals back into units through the Reserve Warrior program has an institutional starting point that can be reviewed and expanded.

A Reserve Flight Operations Force should be built around fixed organizational assignments, ongoing training, and mission certification. Before pilots retire, their willingness to participate and their qualifications could be assessed. Follow-up contacts and training arrangements could then be established based on their previous aircraft type, time away from the service, health, and refresher-training needs. Those who meet the requirements should continue to receive updates on unit procedures and equipment changes, reducing the time needed to reconnect later. Those who have been retired longer or whose relevant qualifications have lapsed should be assigned appropriate refresher training or other specialist duties based on actual assessments.

My recommendation is to begin by establishing a dedicated reserve flight unit within an existing wing structure, with the necessary active-duty management and training personnel. It could then be developed gradually into a mission-capable Reserve Flight Operations Force according to the number of qualified pilots, available aircraft, and supporting resources. A dedicated unit would give personnel clarity about where they belong, how they train in peacetime, and who commands them when mobilized, while enabling qualifications and readiness to be tracked. Whether separate authorized positions or dedicated equipment are needed should be decided after a pilot program and cost assessment.

The missions reserve pilots can perform should also be tiered according to qualifications and training outcomes. Those who meet the relevant requirements could participate in flying missions within their approved qualifications. Those who have not obtained the relevant certification could first contribute to instruction, simulator training, or other support duties. Each duty should have clear authorization so that having once served as a pilot is not confused with currently possessing mission capability. Such ongoing certification is what can make reserve personnel a force whose capabilities can be reliably assessed.

Aviation expertise requires continuous maintenance in particular. Civil aviation experience can help preserve some aviation skills, but operating military aircraft, following military procedures, and coordinating with units still require corresponding training. The frequency and duration of reserve pilots’ training should be determined backward from mission needs and qualification-maintenance standards; existing short-term service models and related regulations should be reviewed where necessary. Qualified instructors, simulators, live-flight training, medical examinations, and flight safety management must all be included in the system’s costs.

Establishing a reserve operations force also requires parallel planning for ground crews, maintenance, communications, computers and electronics, and supply support. Sharing the existing fleet with reserve pilots could be considered as an initial approach, but the availability of aircraft, maintenance capacity, and training resources must still be confirmed. Reserve personnel may reinforce mission staffing, but equipment availability and base operating conditions require their own adequate preparation; the two must work together.

The transition between peacetime and wartime status must also be addressed in advance. The Ministry of National Defense should clarify the legal basis for reserve pilots’ reporting for service, call-up, and mobilization, and stipulate service obligations, compensation, insurance, flight-accident coverage, confidentiality duties, and qualification reviews. For those already employed in civil aviation or other industries, training schedules and staffing arrangements must also be coordinated with employers, and the adequacy of existing labor protections and call-up safeguards should be reviewed. Retired personnel’s willingness to participate can be sustained over the long term only with a reliable system.

A Reserve Flight Operations Force would also face management issues involving senior personnel. Its command relationships should therefore be established through formal organization and mission authorization, avoiding another organization that operates through seniority groups or personal ties. Retention, refresher training, mission assignments, and qualification reviews should follow consistent standards. The value of senior pilots lies in whether their expertise can be effectively used by their units; the system must ensure that expertise and responsibility are aligned.

Implementing this reform also requires confronting the existing limitations of the Reserve Warrior program. In its assessment of the Ministry of National Defense’s budget for fiscal year 2026, the Legislative Yuan Budget Center noted that in recent years the services seeking reserve personnel and recruitment quotas had been limited. At the time, the 2026 plan called for recruiting 35 people, including 16 for the Air Force, and the center recommended a comprehensive review of whether the system met its original objectives.[4] These figures are planning data from that budget assessment. Before establishing a Reserve Flight Operations Force, the Ministry should therefore determine the actual duties, qualification maintenance, training participation, and unit requirements of existing personnel, and use that information to design a pilot program and evaluation criteria.

Civilian transitions are suitable for retaining another part of the expertise. For personnel with skills in flight safety, course design, simulator instruction, tactical research, or training management, the Ministry of National Defense could identify suitable civilian staffing needs and offer opportunities for lawful transfer or employment. A civil-service examination system for retired military personnel already exists, but examinations, appointments, and specialist hiring each have their own legal requirements; different employment statuses must not be treated as freely interchangeable arrangements.[5] Civilian positions should be established according to job requirements and subject to the appropriate evaluations. Actual flying and operational duties must be handled separately in accordance with military qualification requirements and regulations.

Active-duty specialist pilots, a Reserve Flight Operations Force, and civilian specialists can jointly support the Air Force according to their willingness to serve and their capabilities. Those who want to continue full-time service and meet readiness needs could be retained through the specialist flying system. Those who choose retirement and meet reserve requirements could preserve mission capability through ongoing training. Those suited to teaching, research, and management could continue contributing through lawful civilian pathways. The three tracks should have clear responsibilities and compensation, while allowing changes according to qualifications and individual preferences.

Ultimately, this personnel reform must align with Taiwan’s defense needs. Manned fighter aircraft undertake important air defense missions, while mobile air defense, missiles, unmanned systems, distributed sensing, and command systems each also have a role. Given Taiwan’s limited operational depth, the effectiveness of different force combinations should be tested through mission analysis, wargaming, and exercise results. The Ministry of National Defense’s 2025 National Defense Report identifies “multi-domain denial and resilient defense,” asymmetric warfare, and decentralized operations as readiness priorities; personnel policy should align with these directions.[6]

If the number of pilots increases without enough serviceable aircraft, maintenance personnel, and base support, the added personnel will not be able to deliver their full value. If new aircraft are procured, the Air Force should also confirm that pilot training, ground crews, spare parts, and munitions can support them. A Reserve Flight Operations Force likewise requires a full accounting of training and operating costs. Its contribution should be assessed in terms of additional qualified personnel, mission support, and sustained operational effectiveness; it should not be assumed to be cheaper.

Extending Air Force Pilots’ Service to 58: From Retention to a Reserve Flight Operations Force
Extending Air Force Pilots’ Service to 58: From Retention to a Reserve Flight Operations Force

I support the armed forces in establishing more flexible career paths for aviation specialists, and I also advocate formally incorporating the reserve employment of retired pilots into planning. The Ministry of National Defense can begin by reviewing qualified personnel and experience with the existing Reserve Warrior program, then run a pilot in units with the necessary support conditions. Its future scale should be determined according to qualification maintenance, training burden, actual mission contributions, and effects on frontline personnel management. If extending service to age 58 can drive this broader reform, the country can retain mature expertise while developing younger officers and provide retired pilots who wish to continue serving with an institutional pathway to contribute to air defense.

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馬依翔 MA, I-HSIANG

Air Force Reserve Colonel · Korea Scholar · Public Affairs

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