Force restructuring is not just about how many units are added
Taiwan’s armed forces have recently launched a second wave of force restructuring. The Army plans to expand the artillery commands of its three northern, central, and southern army groups. Alongside the gradual deployment of equipment such as the HIMARS multiple rocket launcher system, new self-propelled artillery, and drones, the plan will adjust the organization and employment of firepower units. The Air Force, meanwhile, plans to establish a new security brigade and incorporate one-year conscripts into its base-defense system to strengthen the protection of airfields and key military facilities.
These changes reflect the military’s gradual response to the evolving nature of modern warfare, shifting from traditional force deployment toward long-range precision strikes, the use of unmanned systems, and the defense of key facilities. With China continuing to expand its military capabilities and the security environment across the Taiwan Strait growing increasingly complex, Taiwan’s armed forces do need to reassess their existing force structure so that limited personnel and defense resources can produce greater operational effectiveness.
However, force restructuring is not simply a matter of adding units, adjusting organizational charts, or receiving new weapons. For a modern military, what truly matters is whether organizational changes can translate into real combat capability. Establishing a new battalion or brigade, or increasing the number of weapon systems, represents an investment and an intermediate outcome in the force-building process; it does not mean that a unit has achieved its expected operational effectiveness.
Assessing this round of force restructuring therefore requires returning to the most fundamental questions of military professionalism: How does Taiwan’s military intend to fight? What equipment is needed to support that approach? What kind of force structure should be established? And what training will enable personnel and equipment to become a force that can actually be deployed in battle?
These are the core questions addressed by the force-building principles of “fight, equip, organize, and train.”
Start with “fight”: Operational concepts should determine force structure
Any adjustment to force structure should begin with operational requirements. The military must first establish the threats it expects to face, the kinds of war that may occur, and the tasks units must carry out at different stages of a conflict. Only then can it determine what weapons, organization, and training are needed.
Take the planned expansion of the Army’s artillery commands as an example. The HIMARS multiple rocket launcher system can conduct long-range precision strikes and differs significantly from conventional tube artillery in range, target selection, and tactical employment. When a new weapon is incorporated into the existing artillery system, the first question should not be how many rocket battalions to add, but what role these firepower units will play in the overall defense campaign.
If their primary mission is to support ground forces, their command relationships, target allocation, and fire coordination will differ from the requirements of long-range precision strikes at the campaign level. Different operational missions also directly affect the units’ requirements for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, and logistical support.
The same applies to the creation of an Air Force security brigade. Traditional base-security duties focus on guarding installations, protecting key facilities, and controlling access. But in modern warfare, an air base may face a combination of risks, including missile attacks, drone threats, enemy infiltration, and damage to critical facilities.
Base defense must therefore go beyond expanding traditional guard duties. The mission of security units should be redefined in terms of maintaining the Air Force’s ability to sustain operations. If an airfield runway, fuel or ammunition facilities, or command-and-communications systems are attacked, the coordination of base-security units with air defense, engineers, firefighters, and other support units will directly affect whether the Air Force can maintain its combat capability.
Without first establishing operational requirements, adjusting force structure simply because new equipment has arrived or personnel numbers have increased can leave the organization disconnected from the missions it must actually perform.
Assess “equipment”: Modern weapons do not automatically mean modern combat capability
In recent years, Taiwan’s armed forces have continued to acquire new weapon systems. These include precision-fire capabilities, unmanned vehicles, and air-defense equipment, reflecting efforts to modernize the national defense. But improved weapon performance does not necessarily mean that overall combat capability has increased in step.
The effectiveness of modern weapon systems increasingly depends on integration among different systems. In a long-range precision strike, for example, the launch platform is only one link in the operational chain. The entire process—from detecting targets, analyzing intelligence, and making command decisions to allocating firepower and assessing strike effects—must be effectively connected for a weapon to achieve its intended results.
Without reliable target information, or if command-and-communications systems cannot keep operating under electronic jamming, even highly capable weapons may be unable to strike a target effectively when needed.
It is also worth noting that although greater automation in new equipment may reduce the number of personnel needed to operate an individual weapon, it does not necessarily reduce the personnel requirements of the force as a whole by the same proportion.
For automated artillery or rocket systems, for example, fewer operators may be needed than for conventional artillery, but intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, ammunition supply, equipment maintenance, and battle-damage recovery are still necessary. The more sophisticated a weapon system becomes, the higher the professional demands on related technical personnel may be.
When planning personnel and equipment requirements for new weapons, the Ministry of National Defense should therefore not use the number of people needed to operate a single platform as the sole basis for reducing personnel. It should assess the personnel, logistics, and maintenance capabilities required by the entire operational system.
Completing a weapons purchase should not be treated as the endpoint of force building. Real combat capability rests on equipment, information, command, and logistical support working together.
Consider “organization”: Expansion must not come at the expense of existing units
Another issue worth watching in this round of force restructuring is whether the military’s existing personnel structure can support the demands of new units.
Taiwan’s armed forces have long faced challenges in recruiting and retaining volunteers and developing skilled personnel. As new equipment enters service, the units concerned will need officers, noncommissioned officers, and technical personnel with specialized skills. These people cannot be supplied immediately simply by changing an organizational chart.
Especially when a new unit is first established, experienced personnel often have to be reassigned from existing units to build the organization, receive equipment, conduct specialized training, and manage the unit. Without a sound system for replenishment and replacement, new units may gradually take shape while existing ones lose key personnel and see their readiness decline.
This underscores why force restructuring should not be assessed only by the number of new positions added. It should also examine how efficiently military personnel are distributed across the force as a whole.
For units operating highly specialized new weapons, the priority should be to establish stable systems for developing and retaining skilled personnel, rather than filling vacancies simply by transferring people. For units that can reduce manpower needs through technology, automation, or redesigned missions, the military should also review whether their existing organizational structures still need to be maintained.
The Air Force security brigade’s inclusion of one-year conscripts raises another question about personnel employment. Conscripts can supplement the basic manpower needed for base defense, but professional command, the operation of complex equipment, and tactical coordination still require experienced volunteer cadres at the core.
The new security brigade should therefore establish a reasonable balance between career cadres and conscripts, enabling conscripts to contribute within a complete system of command, training, and logistical support, rather than simply adding numbers to fill base-defense needs.
The purpose of force restructuring should be to improve the operational effectiveness of existing personnel, not to put additional pressure on military manpower that is already stretched thin through further organizational expansion.
Verify through “training”: Completing training tasks does not prove combat readiness
Whether a unit can become an effective fighting force must ultimately be verified through training and evaluation.
Taiwan’s armed forces have long emphasized training plans, the completion of training tasks, and evaluation results. But as the modern warfare environment changes, the training system must also shift gradually from individual specialties and equipment operation toward verifying overall operational capability against compound threats.
For a new artillery unit, for example, the ability of operators to complete firing procedures is only a basic requirement. Realistic operational training must also verify whether a unit can continue to carry out its mission when communications are disrupted, target information is incomplete, resupply is constrained, or command nodes are damaged.
Training for an Air Force security brigade must likewise go beyond testing whether conscripts are familiar with individual weapons, Stinger missiles, or other equipment. Base defense depends on coordination among units with different specialties, so integrated exercises must test how security units and other base units respond together.
The one-year conscription system also entails regular personnel rotations as conscripts complete their service and are replaced. Units must therefore rebuild their combat capability each year. If the training system cannot effectively connect successive intakes, good evaluation results at one point in time may not ensure that a unit can maintain stable readiness throughout the year.
Taiwan’s armed forces should therefore place greater emphasis on the relationship between training outcomes and actual operational missions. Important assessment criteria should include a unit’s ability to sustain operations, coordinate across units, and maintain combat capability after personnel rotations.
Training is not about proving that a plan has been carried out. It is meant to identify problems units may face in real operations and feed those findings back into revisions to operational concepts, equipment employment, and organizational structure.
From equipment-centered to capability-centered: Taiwan’s force-building approach needs further change
This round of force restructuring also raises a more fundamental question: Should Taiwan’s armed forces move beyond a traditional force-building approach that treats equipment and organizational structure as the main planning units, and adopt a model of force development centered on combat capability?
An equipment-centered approach does not mean that the military completely ignores operational requirements. Rather, when force-building plans move into implementation, weapons purchases, equipment quantities, and unit structures can easily become the primary measures of progress.
For example, the number of missile systems purchased, battalion-level units added, or weapon systems replaced all provide clear indicators for administrative management and budget execution, and can easily become the basis for measuring progress in force development.
The problem, however, is that these indicators mainly reflect resource inputs and organizational development; they cannot fully show whether the military is capable of completing its operational missions.
By contrast, Capabilities-Based Planning starts with the missions the military must perform and the capabilities required under different threat scenarios. It assesses existing capability gaps and then determines how equipment, personnel, organization, and training resources should be allocated.
The importance of this approach lies in not treating any particular weapon as the only solution in advance. Instead, it first identifies shortfalls in combat capability and then compares different ways to address them.
For example, if Taiwan’s armed forces want to improve their ability to counter an amphibious landing, the question should not simply be how many more rocket systems are needed. They should first examine where the overall defense system falls short in target detection, fire response, sustained ammunition resupply, and battlefield survivability.
If the main bottleneck is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, adding launch platforms may not effectively improve overall strike capability. If the problem lies in logistical supply and equipment maintenance, simply adding weapons may even increase the burden on the logistics system.
Similarly, strengthening air-base defense should not be measured solely by the increase in security personnel. The key to determining whether the Air Force can continue its missions after an attack is whether its bases have sufficient warning, counter-drone, facility-protection, damage-control, and combat-capability restoration capacity.
From this perspective, force restructuring should not merely expand organizations to accommodate new equipment. It should be an opportunity for Taiwan’s armed forces to conduct a comprehensive review of their operational capability gaps.
Lessons from U.S. capabilities-based planning: Force building needs more than an equipment list
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Defense gradually developed methods related to capabilities-based planning. Through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), it strengthened the link between joint operational requirements and force development.
The core concept is to identify the capabilities required for joint operations and the gaps in those capabilities, then assess how those gaps can be filled, rather than limiting the solution to purchasing new weapons from the outset.
In developing combat capability, the U.S. military also uses the DOTMLPF-P framework to examine the conditions needed to generate operational capability across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.
The most valuable lesson for Taiwan’s armed forces is the reminder that a shortfall in combat capability is not necessarily caused by a lack of equipment.
Some problems may stem from operational doctrine that does not match actual threats; others may come from inefficient command structures. Still others may reflect a lack of skilled personnel, inadequate training systems, or logistical facilities that cannot support existing equipment.
Without first identifying the real capability gaps, the military may continue to spend its budget on weapons without effectively resolving the underlying operational problems.
The U.S. system is, of course, not without flaws. Its complex requirements reviews and acquisition procedures have also been criticized for inefficiency and slow responses. Taiwan does not need to copy the U.S. system wholesale. It should instead adopt the basic principle of identifying capability gaps from mission requirements and integrating the different elements of force development.
For Taiwan, defense resources are limited while the security threats it faces are clear. It is therefore especially important to ensure that every military investment directly or indirectly improves specific operational capabilities.
Establishing a capabilities-oriented force-development assessment system so that defense budgets translate into combat capability
If Taiwan’s armed forces want to put capabilities-based force development into practice, they should establish a complete system that links operational requirements, capability gaps, resource allocation, and operational validation.
First, the Ministry of National Defense should use joint operational requirements as the basis for regularly reviewing capability gaps in existing units under different operational scenarios. The findings should be an important basis for new weapons programs and force-structure adjustments. This work should be coordinated through joint operational requirements, rather than driven by each service’s equipment needs separately.
Second, new weapons programs should assess the required personnel, organizational structure, logistics, training, and facilities at the same time. The planning for equipment procurement budgets should also include the costs of ongoing sustainment, as part of an integrated plan for generating combat capability. This will help avoid discovering after the equipment arrives that there are not enough personnel, maintenance capacity, or training facilities.
Third, Taiwan’s armed forces should establish a cross-service mechanism for validating the development of combat capability. A new unit should not be considered operational merely because it has completed its formation, received its equipment, or finished initial training. It should progressively complete the necessary operational capability validation according to its mission, while its readiness under different threat conditions is reviewed continuously.
In addition, legislative oversight of defense budgets and force-development plans should gradually expand beyond procurement schedules and budget execution rates to cover actual progress in developing operational capabilities. Without disclosing sensitive operational information, the Ministry of National Defense could regularly provide the Legislative Yuan and the public with information on capability-development progress, personnel replenishment, and logistical support for major force-development programs, allowing them to reasonably assess the value of defense investments.
This does not mean requiring the military to disclose operational plans or sensitive capability data. It means establishing a more substantive system of defense governance and performance oversight.
The direction of Taiwan’s second wave of force restructuring is necessary. Faced with an evolving Chinese military threat, Taiwan’s armed forces cannot leave their organizations and operational concepts unchanged, nor can they expect increased defense budgets or advanced weapons alone to automatically create an effective defense capability.
But the success of reform cannot be measured only by the number of units added, weapons purchased, or organizational adjustments completed.
The true purpose of “fight, equip, organize, and train” is to align operational concepts, weapons and equipment, force structure, and education and training, then continually refine them through realistic exercises so that limited defense resources can be turned into real combat capability.
Going forward, Taiwan’s armed forces should further incorporate capabilities-based planning into force-development decisions: start from operational missions, identify capability gaps, and then decide how personnel, equipment, and budgets should be allocated.
For Taiwan, the goal of defense reform should never be merely to build a military with more equipment and a larger organization. It should be to build a military that can respond to actual threats, sustain operations, and effectively defend the country at critical moments.
The measure of force-development success is not how many units have been added to the organizational chart, but how much usable combat capability the country has actually gained.